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Abstract	
This	contribution	addresses	the	input	legitimacy	of	the	British	EU	membership	referendum	of	June	
2016.	It	considers	who	was	given	a	vote	in	the	first	place,	and	whether	those	given	a	vote	could	
make	a	reasonable	choice	in	light	of	the	campaign.	More	precisely,	it	assesses	the	following	four	
criteria:	the	franchise,	the	presence	of	clarity,	the	amount	and	quality	of	information,	and	the	quality	
of	public	debate,	arguing	that	instances	of	direct	democracy,	such	as	referendums,	require	higher	
standards	of	civic	behaviour	from	both	elected	representatives	and	voters	than	those	required	of	
representative	democracy.	The	empirical	analysis	of	these	criteria	shows	that	the	referendum	fell	
short	regarding	the	first	two	criteria	whilst	it	could	have	done	better	as	regards	the	last	two.	The	
paper	concludes	by	briefly	discussing	what	can	be	learnt	from	this	referendum	for	future	
referendums.	
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Assessing the democratic legitimacy of the 2016 Brexit referendum 
1. Introduction 
Much has been said about the referendum on British membership of the EU since the 23rd of 
June 2016 (Armstrong 2017; Clark, Goodwin and Whiteley 2017; Curtice 2017; Glencross 
2016; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Gormley-Heenan and Aughey 2017; Hobolt 2016; 
Hopkin 2017, amongst many others). Commentators have mostly focused on the 
demographics of the result as well as the factors that determined voters’ choices. By contrast, 
there has been little scholarly reflection on how democratically legitimate the referendum 
process can be said to be (but see Bellamy 2018), not least because this type of reflection can 
only follow the availability of research results about the campaign. The legitimacy of the 
referendum process therefore forms the topic of this contribution1. It thereby not only helps to 
close a research gap. It also opens reflection on what can be learned from the 2016 
referendum for future referendums. 
Though many will not agree, I consider that it is possible to argue that a ‘good’ 
referendum which meets certain criteria can strengthen the democratic legitimacy of a 
contentious policy, such as remaining or leaving the European Union (EU) (Rose 2013). My 
aim here, however, is not to discuss the legitimacy of referendums per se. Instead, I shall look 
at how democratically legitimate the referendum process can be said to be if we consider that 
its legitimacy is linked to certain criteria. I appreciate that there is a wealth of relevant criteria 
one could look at and that as a result, not everyone will agree with the selected criteria. For 
instance, one might want to address the role Parliament plays in the process (Chalmers 2017); 
or the no less important constitutional questions of how to deal in a democratically legitimate 
way with different majorities in the devolved regions or of which role the devolved nations 
should play in the process of leaving the EU (McHarg and Mitchell 2017; Soares 2016). I do 
not dispute in the least that these and other questions are democratically relevant, they are just 
not the focus of this paper. Instead, I shall address questions of input legitimacy that consider 
who was given a vote in the first place, and whether those given a vote could make a 
reasonable choice in light of the campaign. Why this focus on input legitimacy? 
																																								 																				
1 Dr Sandra Kröger, Department of Politics, University of Exeter (Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 
4RJ, United Kingdom. Phone: +44-1392-263285 Mail: S.Kroeger@exeter.ac.uk.) I would like to thank Richard 
Bellamy, Chris Lord and Albert Weale for their constructive engagement with an earlier version of the paper 
which helped me improve it. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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First, democracy is more than a formal framework which assures formal rights to 
citizens and that those in power are elected in free, fair and recurring elections. Democracy is 
also about processes seeking to make sure that all citizens have opportunities to participate in 
politics, to voice their opinions and influence political decision-making, and to ensure that all 
citizens and their interests are represented (Dahl 1989). Of course output legitimacy in 
general also matters for democracies. However, given that democratic processes are instituted 
to decide matters that people disagree about – such as whether to belong to the EU – the core 
of their legitimacy rests on there being a fair process to decide these disputed matters, so that 
the results will be acceptable also to the ‘losers’ of a specific decision. Second, referendums 
are widely discussed as a means of increasing the input legitimacy of democracies, so 
focusing on input legitimacy seems reasonable. Third, focusing on the outcome of the 
referendum could be reasonably accused of being biased, suggesting that one would argue 
that it was democratic if the outcome was to one’s liking and not democratic if it was not. 
The paper proceeds as follows. I will first develop criteria of input legitimacy as 
discussed in democratic theory: 1) the franchise, 2) presence of clarity, 3) amount and quality 
of information, and 4) the quality of public debate. In a next step, I will explore whether the 
Brexit referendum lived up to these four criteria. In so doing, I will primarily draw on 
available research findings, which implies that the assessment is by definition restricted by 
that literature and its findings. Second, and as a result, the assessment of the quality of 
information and debate are relative rather than absolute, implying that the interpretation is 
also relative. The empirical analysis of these criteria shows that the referendum fell short 
regarding the first two criteria whilst it could have done better as regards the last two. The 
final section discusses whether the criteria used for the analysis are too stringent, and what 
can be learned for future referendums. 
 
2. Defining the democratic legitimacy of a referendum 
To answer the question of how legitimate the EU membership referendum in the UK was 
requires a notion of legitimacy. When defining legitimacy, scholars typically look at input 
and/or outcome criteria (Scharpf 1999). Looking at the latter, whether staying or leaving the 
EU will produce just policies and improve everybody’s welfare as well as grant the UK more 
sovereignty and democracy, is a very important issue. Indeed, not a few consider it is so 
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important that it should not have been the object of a referendum in the first place. However, 
it does not say much about whether the process leading to the referendum result was 
democratically legitimate. Instead, it is the quality of the democratic process that is crucial to 
ensuring that conflicts can be managed peacefully and for losers to be able to accept the result 
of the referendum, if only in a preliminary way. Therefore, democratic legitimacy is largely a 
matter of input rather than outcome (Buchanan 2002). 
How, then, can we define input legitimacy? A common definition is that input 
legitimacy derives from a process in which all relevant parties are entitled to have their views 
and interests treated with equal respect and concern (Scharpf 1999). In the context of the 
referendum, for this to be the case, we need to take into account the following criteria: (1) 
how the franchise is defined, (2) the presence of clarity, (3) the amount and quality of 
information, and (4) the quality of public debate. These criteria are – as I shall argue – what 
makes input legitimacy of a referendum, as defined above, possible. Let us look at each of 
these in turn. 
	
2.1. Franchise 
In order to address whether the process entitled ‘all relevant parties’ to have their views 
expressed, we must first of all look at the franchise which answers the question of ‘who 
belongs to the people?’ The standard view of political community is that entitlements to a say 
over collective matters should follow membership, formalized as citizenship. Importantly, 
citizenship has in modern democracies been linked to nation-states. This standard view is 
well reflected in the stakeholder account of political rights and obligations, in which the 
claim to being a citizen of a given political community belongs to those whose freedom and 
rights are inherently linked to the collective self-government and flourishing of this polity 
over time (Bauböck 2015). On this account, one would include those individuals in the 
franchise who enjoy citizenship of the given country.  
However, due to increasing social and political entanglements as well as changing 
ethics, this reading of membership in a political community has been increasingly challenged, 
and a number of scholars argue for an extension of participation rights to other persons, such 
as non-citizens, who were previously not included in the franchise.  
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Some authors have pled in favour of the all-affected principle (AAP). The principle 
suggests that those whose interests are being affected by a decision should be able to 
influence the making of that same decision (Goodin 2007). The AAP thus determines the 
scope of the people on the basis of the scope of the decision at hand. The obvious problem 
with this approach is its ‘over-inclusiveness’ (Goodin 2007, pp. 49, 57). The latter is perhaps 
not surprising given the cosmopolitan drive of the supporters of the AAP, but leaves us 
uncertain as to whose interests are actually being affected. Also, one can easily see that for 
many, if not most, decisions, some citizens’ interests will be affected more than other 
citizens’ interests, thereby introducing the challenge of having to weigh interests and 
allocating proportional voting rights (Miller 2009, p. 216; Warren 2017, p. 9). 
 Other scholars have argued in favour of the all-subjected principle (ASP). Crucially, 
and unlike the AAP, the ASP links democracy to the nation-state and argues that ‘all those 
subjected to political rule within its boundaries ought to have a say in its making’ (Näsström 
2011, p. 117), a proposition that comes fairly close to the idea of ‘no taxation without 
representation’. The ASP as a result has been used to demand greater political inclusion, 
mostly of migrants, within the nation-state. For if resident aliens are obliged to abide by the 
rules of a state, why should they not have the right to participate in its decisions (Gould 2006, 
p. 49)? Anything else, so the argument runs, results in the ‘effective disenfranchisement’ 
(Benhabib 2004, p. 215) of permanent residents from national politics. 
I will propose that a mix of the stakeholder principle and the ASP should have 
prevailed in the British in/out referendum in order for all relevant views and interests to be 
treated with equal concern. The mix results from the fact that the stakeholder perspective 
appears too narrow whereas the ASP appears too broad. Why is this so? 
On the one hand, the strong link that the former establishes between presence, 
attachment to the political community and citizenship rights and obligations is not fit for 
purpose. Some might object that the franchise ought to be linked in a straightforward way to 
citizenship, so that only the British people decide on their membership of the EU and no one 
else. However, in a context where one of the leading legal rules in the EU is freedom of 
movement between (participating) states, this very principle has created reasonable 
expectations for EU citizens resident in the UK. EU law entitled EU citizens who have settled 
in the UK to reside there without having to naturalise (and to vote for European and local 
elections). Without a willingness to legislate, prior to the vote, that permanent resident rights 
established prior to a potential Brexit should continue after Brexit, those expectations could 
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not be met. As a result, the agreement of the British people to free movement under the EU 
Treaties implied an obligation to include EU residents in the UK in the referendum on EU 
membership, similar to the inclusion of EU citizens in the Scottish independence referendum 
in 2014. The potential objection that citizens moving to the UK freely undertook the risk of 
the UK using Article 50 to depart from the EU is at best valid for those who moved to the UK 
after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, since this article did not exist before. But 
even after 2009, can we reasonably expect citizens to be aware of this specific article? 
Others might object that extending the stakeholder principle to those EU citizens 
resident in the UK is not sufficient and that the UK is not the relevant polity for the 
stakeholder principle (which instead is the EU). However, when applying normative criteria 
to real world processes, one needs to take the concrete context of those processes into 
account. In the present case, that means taking into account a) that the nation-state has not 
lost its meaning and function to such a degree that governments and citizens would be 
prepared to let individuals participate in political choices about their ‘own’ country when 
those individuals do not even live on the respective territory, b) that the EU allows for a 
member state to leave the EU ‘in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’ as per 
article 50, without consultation of the other member states or their populations, and c) that we 
have freedom of movement in the EU and that EU citizens living in the UK at the time of the 
referendum therefore had established rights. 
On the other hand, the weak link that the ASP sees between presence, attachment to 
the political community and citizenship rights and obligations does not accept that people 
move (travel) in different capacities. For instance, some citizens will have spent their 
holidays in the UK over the 23rd of June 2016 and as such were subject to British law on UK 
territory. Certainly, that should not have entitled them to a vote. The same can be said about 
short-term guest workers, who by definition will have left long before any of the 
consequences of the vote will materialise, as well as potential future migrants who have not 
become residents in the UK yet and as a result have not established rights.  
In contrast, EU citizens residing in the UK are directly and strongly affected by the 
decision, particularly in the case of a leave vote. In the case of a leave vote, lives will be and 
have already been affected by the same changing economic conditions, e.g. living costs as 
well as employment opportunities (think of firms that are relocating to other EU member 
states) as everyone else living in the UK. In addition, however, EU citizens residing in the 
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UK are a special case. Many of them came and settled because of free movement entitlements 
within the EU. With a leave vote, their lives can be and have already been affected 
substantially in terms of rights as well as employment opportunities, possibly prompting 
families to move to other EU member states. Given this result, they should have been 
included in the franchise. 
 
2.2. Clarity 
Let us move on to the next criterion that enables democratic participation. In order for all 
relevant parties to be able to express their views and interests, it is crucial that there is clarity 
about the policy at stake. In our case, this means that the question to be asked in the 
referendum needs to be clear (LeDuc 2015: 141). Likewise, what follows from the chosen 
answer to the question needs to be clear to voters (Renwick et al. 2018: 546). Clarity exists 
when ‘the various sides of an argument are well known and well established in the public 
discourse’ (LeDuc 2015: 142-143). If asked to tick a box without knowledge of what each 
option represents, one is not casting a meaningful vote. Indeed, these principles are also laid 
out by the British Electoral Commission: ‘Informed voters are fundamental to a well-run 
referendum, and this means that those eligible to vote (…) should be able to understand the 
referendum question, the possible outcomes and the campaign arguments’ (Electoral 
Commission 2016: 37). Clarity of the question as well as the implications of either choice is a 
crucial precondition for a meaningful debate during the campaign as well as a meaningful 
vote. 
 
2.3. Information 
Third, the amount and quality of information matter for a legitimate process. Citizens need to 
be informed about politics to hold informed opinions, to participate in politics and make 
choices that align with their interests (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Milner 2002). In order 
for the process to be fair and impartial with regard to the different views, spending in the 
campaign needs to be regulated so as to ensure that neither side over-spends and has similar 
chances to put an argument forward. It is furthermore important that the information be 
circulated evenly, assuring that voters receive information from both sides and can as a result 
make an informed decision. Media has a crucial part to play in assuring that information is 
reported in a balanced way and that the arguments of either side are made available to the 
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public. However, information need not only be available; it also needs to be of high quality, 
which one can define as information that ‘is accurate, impartial, accessible to as many people 
as possible, and relevant to people’s concerns’ (Renwick et al. 2018: 549). For voters to make 
a free choice, trustworthy information should be readily available to them. If voters’ choices 
are based on misinformation or deceit, they cannot be sure to actually vote in a manner that 
best serves their own interests. Furthermore, their capacity to hold office holders and 
campaigners to account will be reduced.  
 
2.4. Public Debate 
The last criterion is public debate. Public debate is crucial as it is here where persuasion can 
occur as arguments are exchanged and defended and can be weighed against one another. 
Public debate should be organized around alternative conceptions of the public good. It is 
where information, views, arguments and counter arguments on relevant issues ideally are 
expressed and tested as well as channelled into administrations. As such it serves different 
purposes. Public debates can act as processes that convey information. Given no individual 
alone possesses all the relevant information about any given policy, sharing information in 
public debates is important. Likewise, the different views that actors hold are rarely if ever 
known by the larger public, rendering a public sphere and debate where they can become 
known essential. Public debate thus reveals issues that bear significance for the whole society 
and contributes to the solution of problems. Indeed, these functions of public debates resonate 
well with Kant’s idea of debate as a tool of enlightenment. Furthermore, public debate should 
feed into parliamentary debates as well as government policies. If there is no public debate, 
then the link between society and government and state would be interrupted and democracy 
would become elitist. As such, public debates also help to hold MPs and administrations to 
account. It is through these different functions that public debate contributes to democratic 
legitimacy (Habermas 1962). These days, public debate takes place mostly through the mass 
media, but also increasingly through social media, as well as public meetings, which indicates 
that there are different forums with at least in part different publics, rendering it more 
difficult to realise the above described ideals. 
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Having established the four criteria against which to assess the democratic legitimacy 
of the referendum process, I will now move on to an empirical assessment of how far it lived 
up to them. 
 
 3. Assessing the democratic legitimacy of the Brexit referendum 
3.1. The franchise 
The franchise for the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union was 
defined in the EU Referendum Act 2015. It provided that the franchise be based on the 
general election franchise, with provision made also for members of the House of Lords to 
vote, along with electors in Gibraltar. In so doing, the definition of the franchise followed the 
stakeholder account sketched above. Even from an all-subjected principle perspective, the 
exclusion of those expatriates who have not lived on British territory for more than 15 years 
seems entirely justifiable.  
However, the Referendum Act reduced the electorate in a less justifiable way, i.e. by 
excluding EU citizens resident in the UK, meaning that 2.15 million adult EU citizens (Fox et 
al. 2016: 507), most of whom pay taxes in the UK, were denied universal and equal suffrage 
(Low 2017: 2). As a result, some of those ‘most likely to be strongly affected by the decision 
– long-term external citizens, many of whom rely on EU citizenship rights to reside in the 
host state, non-UK EU citizens resident in the UK and younger people – were precisely those 
deprived of a voice’ (Shaw 2017: 567). 
Why was that so? The House of Commons Briefing Paper 07212, published on 3 June 
2015, told all MPs and members of the House of Lords that the results of a referendum would 
not need to be implemented (House of Commons 2015: 25) and thus would not be binding on 
Parliament or government. This was ‘the reason given for not extending the franchise 
appropriately.’ (Grayling 2017: 190). Another reason for letting the Brexit fraction of the 
Conservative party define the franchise in the way that suited them best – namely excluding 
British expats, 16-17 year-olds and EU citizens, the inclusion of whom would have favoured 
a ‘Remain’ vote – was that nobody expected Leave to win (see Shipman 2016). 
As a result of the definition of the franchise, not all relevant parties could see their 
views and interests represented with equal respect and concern. As a result, the input 
legitimacy of the process suffered.  
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3.2. The presence of clarity 
The referendum question read ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union or leave the European Union?’ The question as such is very clear. The 
trouble is that ‘Remain’ or ‘Leave’ never were just one option. For instance, ‘Leave’ is a term 
for a number of alternatives, such as staying in the single market and/or the customs union, 
Norway, Canada, WTO framework, etc. Once we look at the different Leave options, we see 
that a majority for ‘Leave’ does not express the will of the people in respect of any one of 
those alternatives. Research from the Electoral Commission has found that 45% of polled 
people found it ‘difficult to access information about what would happen in the event of a 
Leave vote’ whereas 41% found this easy (Electoral Commission 2016: 44). These numbers 
suggest that the public were deprived of clarity about what would happen in the case of a 
‘Leave’ vote, thereby rendering a meaningful vote difficult. Let me illustrate this point with a 
different example. 
Imagine 40 per cent of the population is vegetarian, 30 per cent loves pork but abhors 
beef, and the remaining 30 per cent love beef but cannot eat pork. A vote on the question 
‘who wants to eat meat tonight?’ could yield a 60 per cent majority. Yet both the pork and the 
beef options are rejected by 70 per cent of the population. The reason is simple: ‘meat’ is not 
actually a real option. ‘Meat’ means something different to different voters, and the 60 per 
cent majority in favour of ‘meat’ is the sum of mutually incompatible beef and pork eaters2. 
To make things worse, any skilled politician can evade criticism of the ‘meat’ option by 
switching from one definition to the other as convenient.  
Transferred to the in/out referendum this means that the vagueness of the ‘Leave’ 
option allowed its campaign to cast the widest net of all, encouraging each voter to keep their 
most favourable version of Brexit in mind, however far that may have been from reality. It 
allowed hard and soft Brexiteers, free-market fundamentalists and protectionists, open-door 
internationalists and xenophobes to all add their votes together (Grayling 2017: 194), creating 
a coalition of incompatible voters. One might object that at a higher level of aggregation, 
most ‘Leave’ voters agreed with the slogan of ‘taking back control’ so as to achieve fuller 
sovereignty somehow and also be able to control borders. However, this ‘agreement’ rested 
by and large on a false knowledge of the status ante quo and/or false expectations as to what 
																																								 																				
2 We know from related research that having more than two options for voters to choose from comes 
with its own problems (Weale 1999: 132-37).  
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might be achievable in terms of sovereignty and border control post Brexit and/or different 
degrees to which voters agreed to the slogan as well as the type of policy they would like to 
see implemented post Brexit. Consequently, most ‘Leave’ voters will not get the Brexit they 
thought they voted for.  
In sum, the question of the referendum was not answerable because the implications 
of either outcome were unclear, and the different alternatives were not sufficiently specified 
(Allen 2018: 110; Renwick et al. 2018: 546). Whilst there was a (tight) majority for some 
version of Leave, we do not know the real preferences of those who voted Leave. In other 
words, the first referendum hid the different preferences that supported Leave. As a result, the 
democratic legitimacy of the process was harmed. 
	
3.3. The amount and quality of information 
As discussed above, one of the preconditions for a fair campaign is that both sides of the 
campaign have access to similar amounts of funding. In the present case, campaigners were 
‘subject to the PPERA3 regulatory framework which places limitations on spending by 
campaigners and provides transparency about sources of funding’ (Electoral Commission 
2016: 9). For each campaign, regulation foresaw a spending limit of £7m. It has in the 
meantime come to light that Vote Leave spent at least £625,000 over its spending limit, 
funnelling said amount into BeLeave, the youth arm of the Leave campaign. The over-spent 
cash went into online advertising, targeting people based on individual psychological 
profiles. According to evidence heard by a House of Commons Committee in March 2018, 
those profiles were built through Facebook and other data, without consent or knowledge of 
UK voters. They were first sold to Cambridge Analytica LLC and then to a Canadian 
corporation, Aggregate IQ Ltd, hired by Vote Leave, to target UK voters4. In July 2018, the 
Electoral Commission confirmed that Vote Leave had broken electoral law, not least by 
breaking spending limits. We cannot know the impact that the spending fraud of Vote Leave 
																																								 																				
3 The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000	
4 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/26/pressure-grows-on-pm-over-brexit-cambridge-
analytica-scandal-theresa-may	
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had. What we do know is that there was fraud, which decreases the democratic legitimacy of 
the process. 
Turning to the amount of information, voters had access to a multitude of sources of 
information, both online and offline. Online sources consist of the websites of media, 
government bodies, academia, think tanks and social media. Offline sources consist of 
printed media, television, political events, and peers. Though it is fairly safe to assume that 
the average voter will not explore all of these sources to inform themselves, it is also fair to 
assume that taken together, these different sources produced a sufficient amount of 
information, though as discussed above, perhaps not necessarily the relevant information. 
Indeed, when asked, 84% of the respondents said that they knew ‘a great deal’ (34%) or ‘a 
fair amount’ (50%) about what the referendum was for (Electoral Commission 2016: 44). 
However, when respondents were asked whether they had enough information to be able to 
make an informed decision, only 62% agreed whereas 28% disagreed (ibid., 45). 
This brings us to the quality of information, for what is having a lot of information 
good for if it does not allow voters to make an informed decision? As is known, the 
campaigns were plagued by little lies, half-truths and misinformation (Renwick et al. 2018: 
546). The most prominent example of misleading the public is the £350 million a week that 
Boris Johnson and others suggested would go to the NHS once the UK would have left the 
EU. It has become clear that this will not happen. By way of another example, a key them of 
the Leave campaign was the idea of ‘taking back control’ and restoring a classic notion of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. This slogan was based on a false characterisation of the pooling of 
sovereignty that membership of the EU involves. Whilst it is true that the Court of Justice of 
the European Union can de facto overrule national courts and national Parliaments, it is also 
true that Parliament had previously decided to give away some of its ‘sovereignty’ to the EU, 
because it was of the view that to get on in a globalising world, it is necessary to sign up to 
international treaties, not least with immediate geographic neighbours. In fact, even strong 
Leave supporters have recognised that the slogan was ‘a misleading half-truth’ (Rose, 2018: 
13). On the other side, the Remain campaign repeatedly used unverified numbers to forecast 
an economic breakdown in the case of exiting the EU. 
Indeed, the Electoral Commission received more than 1,000 complaints from the 
public about the content of campaign material. Furthermore, only 34% of the respondents of 
post-referendum research agreed with the statement that the conduct of the campaigns was 
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fair and balanced, with a mere 12% agreeing strongly (Electoral Commission 2016: 47). The 
main reasons given for considering that the conduct of the campaign was not fair and 
balanced were that the campaign was ‘one-sided/unbalanced/biased/partial’ (31%) and the 
information was ‘inaccurate and misleading’ (31%) (ibid.). Indeed, supporters of both sides 
of the campaign have acknowledged that ‘truth was badly compromised in much of the 
campaign’ (Low 2017), thereby further reducing the democratic legitimacy of the process. 
Richard Bellamy considers that the fact that the campaigns involved half-truths and 
misinformation is not relevant given voters would be used to it from regular elections and 
thus even expect it (Bellamy 2018: 4). However, the main difference compared to regular 
elections of course is that the in/out referendum was a one-off ‘event’ with a priori no 
opportunity to hold the leading figures of either campaign to account. Therefore, there was 
even less incentive to act in a truthful way. 
The media are the source of a vast amount of information received by the public, and 
it is their responsibility to inform and educate in an unbiased way, as well as to interpret. It 
has been suggested that the media did not do enough to retract lies, misinformation or 
unsubstantiated insinuations (Seaton 2016). Even the BBC has seen itself confronted with 
criticism for treating all arguments ‘as of equal value, giving equal airtime to unequal 
arguments’ (Parker 2017: 7). As a result, the arguments that were presented in debates often 
lacked the necessary proportion and expert critique, thus leaving half-truths unexplored and 
insufficiently countered (Seaton 2016: 335-336), something which was dubbed a ‘fairness 
bias’ by Timothy Garton Ash5.  
Some might say that all the necessary information was available, not least through 
fact-checking provided by the BBC and The Guardian, and people simply did not want to 
know or listen (Bellamy 2018). However, the average citizen will not go to the EU websites 
(or even the BBC) to find out whether a claim made by either side of the campaign is true or 
not. Citizens depend on party actors and on the media to give them cues, also in regard to 
European integration (Hobolt and de Vries 2016: 422). To some extent, they do not even go 
as far as that and instead rely on peers in their echo chambers – though again, cues there will 
have more often than not originated in some media outlet, and will often revolve around what 
some politician has said. Therefore, what party actors and the media offer in terms of 
																																								 																				
5 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/01/bbc-brexit-too-timid-impartial-on-eu-not-
enough  
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information is highly important, though it leaves unanswered the question of which 
responsibility voters have to inform themselves properly.  
In sum, the assessment of this criterion is mixed. There seems to have been some 
overspending by Leave, thereby challenging the idea that both campaigns had the same 
chances to convince voters. Still, it cannot be denied that a wealth of information was 
available on either side of the campaign, though it was not always put to good use. Again, 
this is likely linked to the absence of clarity as to what leaving the EU might actually mean. 
Overall, one certainly can argue that the democratic process was harmed both by the fraud as 
well as the half-truths and misinformation involved. This leads our discussion to the last 
criterion of input legitimacy, i.e. the quality of public debate. 
3.4. The quality of public debate 
The media also has an important role to play so far as public debate is concerned. By and 
large, they provide the forum in which different arguments are reported and exchanged. Did 
the media make arguments from either side available to the public? It is possible to claim that 
overall, one could find different arguments in the media. However, there are two caveats.  
First, whereas in broadsheets one could find arguments both in favour and against 
staying in the EU, the arguments put forward in tabloids were much more unidirectional and 
less balanced. As a result, the audience of the pro-Leave tabloids was mostly exposed to one-
sided, Eurosceptic arguments. Second, of the nine main national daily newspapers, five 
supported the Leave campaign. These were the Sun, Daily Express, Daily Star, Daily Mail, 
and Daily Telegraph. Three newspapers were mostly pro-Remain: The Guardian, Daily 
Mirror, and the Financial Times. Of these only the Mirror has a circulation that compares 
with that of the Leave newspapers. The other main national daily, The Times, adopted a more 
or less neutral position (Levy et al. 2016). As a result, 80 per cent of people who regularly 
bought a daily newspaper bought a title favouring Leave (Levi et al. 2016), implying that the 
Eurosceptic discourse of the main tabloids reached a much larger audience. The combined 
effect of these two factors – unidirectional reporting of tabloids and wider reach of tabloids – 
was that, of the referendum-focused articles that reached their audience, 48 per cent were pro-
Leave and just 22 per cent pro-Remain (Levi et al. 2016)6. This perhaps does not come as a 
																																								 																				
6 That said, research findings are inconclusive as to the influence of newspapers on voting choice. 
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surprise given most British tabloids have run, for several decades, a campaign against the EU 
(Daddow 2012), as was documented in June 2016 by the Economist7.  
 When looking at the quality of the public debate, we obviously should not only look 
at the media, but also at those who provide the cues, more often than not, that the media and 
others will then pick up, i.e. political leaders. Did they discuss their arguments against each 
other, in public? This happened to some degree in televised debates, and when prominent 
representatives of either side made public speeches. However, politicians mostly put forward 
an argument about the advantages of their respective perspectives – or, on the Remain 
campaign, the disadvantages of leaving the EU – without directly engaging with each other’s 
arguments or the ‘facts’ that the other side used. Instead, we witnessed a cherry-picking of 
numbers and arguments depending on which perspective was adopted. Let us illustrate the 
point by means of two prominent examples. The first is the question of whether or not the UK 
can manage the scale of immigration into its territory while a member of the EU. Leave 
suggested it cannot and that being a member of the EU meant signing up to the principle of 
free movement for EU nationals. Whilst this is correct, it missed the point that migration to 
the UK is more than just intra-EU migration. ‘Remain’ in turn said that if the government 
chose to, the UK would be able to turn EU nationals away for reasons of public security or 
health. Whilst this is also correct, it did not really engage with the argument put forward by 
the Leave side. The second example concerns the amount of legislation coming from 
Brussels. ‘Leave’ claimed that up to 60 per cent of all the UK’s laws are made in Brussels 
whereas ‘Remain’ would suggest that the number is nearer to 13 per cent. Interestingly, both 
sides got their numbers from the same source (a 2010 analysis by the House of Commons 
Library), and both claims were equally correct. It all depends on what is included in the 
definition of EU law. The estimates at the higher end of the spectrum included EU rules that 
are not laws in a meaningful sense, such as administrative decisions, and regulations that are 
not relevant to the UK. However, this difference was not explained to the public, and 
arguments did not get properly discussed against each other, reducing the democratic 
legitimacy of the process further. 
																																								 																				
7 The Economist published the chart ‘Lies, Damned Lies, and Directives’, which documents decades 
of flat-out lies about EU regulations that were published in the tabloid press: 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/06/daily-chart-15, accessed 5 February 2018.	
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Let us sum up. The first criterion, the definition of the franchise so as to include all 
who are permanently subject to British law on British territory and over 16, was not met. The 
second criterion, the presence of clarity, was met half-way. Whereas the referendum question 
itself was clear, the implications, particularly of ‘leave,’ were anything but. As a result, it was 
difficult if not impossible to make an ‘informed decision’. The third criterion was the amount 
and quality of information. We know that there has been over-spending by the Leave 
campaign. Information was accessible to many people and as such, there was a sufficient 
amount of information. However, it was not always accurate nor impartial. Instead, voters 
were exposed to a series of half-truths as well as misinformation, and print media was heavily 
biased in favour of Leave. As regards the fourth and final criterion, public debate, this might 
be the criterion that comparatively speaking scores best amongst the four criteria. Different 
arguments were made, both by politicians and by the media. However, the quality of the 
debate was poor because there was a cherry-picking of arguments rather than looking at the 
question of EU membership in a more holistic way, and arguments were not discussed 
against each other but in isolation.  
In light of the above findings, the assessment cannot but be that the input legitimacy 
of the British membership referendum as defined in the context of this contribution was 
harmed, bearing in mind the caveat that the assessment was restricted to available secondary 
literature. 
 
Conclusion 
In this contribution, I have looked at the democratic legitimacy of the British in/out 
referendum of 2016. I have suggested that its legitimacy depends on certain criteria, namely 
the franchise, presence of clarity, amount and quality of information, and public debate. The 
empirical analysis of these criteria showed that the referendum fell short of the first two 
whilst it could have done better for the latter two. 
One might ask whether the criteria I have put forward in this contribution are not too 
stringent. After all, we do not suggest that general elections are illegitimate if the foregoing 
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campaigns (sender) included different bits of misinformation or when some voters (receiver) 
may have made their choice based on wrong information. Whilst these are fair objections, we 
need to recognize there are important differences between general elections and one-off 
referendums which change the game to some degree. If elected politicians hand over very 
important decisions to voters, then this comes with an even stronger responsibility on their 
part to stay truthful and not seek to manipulate the electorate. However, elected politicians 
have less of an incentive to remain truthful in referendum campaigns compared to general 
elections, given that referendums are one-off events and the politicians cannot be thrown out 
of office by voters if their recommendations prove flawed or false. In the present case, this 
argument weighs particularly heavily since leaving the EU will shut the door to renewed 
British EU membership for the foreseeable future whilst having a considerable, and probably 
negative, impact on the economy in the short to medium term. In other words, the fact that 
elected politicians cannot be held to account by voters after the vote increases the need for 
them to act in ways consistent with quite stringent criteria, such as those proposed here. To 
allow them to do otherwise can only diminish popular trust in representative institutions.  
At the same time, handing over very important decisions to voters also places greater 
responsibilities and obligations on the electorate as well, not least the obligation to inform 
themselves more and better than they would do in the context of general elections. In 
representative democracy, voters are normally quite happy to delegate the responsibility to 
govern and steer to those very few elected politicians who, in turn, are happy to make it their 
full-time job and as a result have more information on specific policies than the average 
voter. In forms of direct democracy such as referendums, this duty to be informed and act 
responsibly lies both with elected politicians who have decided to hand over a decision to 
voters, and with the voters themselves. It is difficult to see how democratic legitimacy would 
pass a serious test if both sides did not accept this responsibility. 
To conclude, let us briefly look at what can be learned from the recent British EU 
membership referendum. The single most important lesson is that governments should not 
call referendums if they cannot be very clear about what each option of the ballot paper 
involves. Cameron’s commitment to a referendum did not come from a careful analysis of 
what an EU membership referendum would involve, what the implications of a ‘Leave’ vote 
might be, nor how leaving the EU could be implemented. Instead, he sought to appease his 
backbenchers, and prioritised winning the next general elections over carefully considering 
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what a referendum on the EU might involve (Renwick et al. 2018: 546). The consequences of 
holding a referendum on an as important question without it having been clear from the start 
what ‘Leave’ would mean can be observed in British politics ever since. There was no clarity 
for voters what ‘Leave’ would entail, which allowed for a poor-quality campaign. Worse, not 
only has the country been utterly divided since the vote, but even MPs and the government 
struggle to know what type of Brexit they should deliver; this has led to widespread 
confusion, to the point that crashing out of the EU without any deal does not seem impossible 
at the end of 2018. In sum, ‘a referendum is a mechanism for deciding between two options. 
It is not in itself a mechanism through which the form of those options can be developed’ 
(Renwick et al. 2018: 547).  
Second, and as regards the campaign, it might be worthwhile considering using 
deliberative forums and citizens assemblies more. In a political environment in which the 
media landscape is as polarised and ideological about an issue as the British tabloids are 
about the EU, and where citizens mistrust politicians to a high degree, it is worth 
experimenting more with forms of citizen education and enabling. Though only a few voters 
can ever participate in these forums, their results can be made broadly available, and might be 
trusted more by peers than what distant media or politicians claim. 
Third, and finally, referendums in general, and in particular in democracies where 
they are used rarely, should be complementary to representative democracy and not substitute 
it. In the present case, Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum on EU membership was 
driven by party-political goals. Instead, it should have been embedded in a discussion process 
in Parliament where government and opposition parties could have debated the problems they 
saw and how they might best be addressed, as well as which options should be put to the 
voter, if any. 
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